Monday, September 14, 2015

Costa Rica and PES


Re-post:

One of the things we learn in natural resource economics is to look at problems in terms of their costs and benefits.  By asking questions about who gains and who loses (and when, and how) we can gain an important perspective on the causes of natural resource problems. 

When given access to private benefits from natural resources, people tend to take actions that promote their own well-being. This access comes in the form of our daily contact with open-access and common property resources as well as extraction and habitat conversion on private lands. We all pollute in numerous ways to promote our own benefits (comfort, convenience, standard of living), because it’s cheap and easy to do so. As individuals, the costs we pay for access to the world’s resources are low because they are shared by everyone. 

How do we change the calculus?  Let’s try everything and see what works. Education, an appeal to “do the right thing”, and legal mandates on acceptable use, all serve important roles.  Monetary incentives that affect individual costs and benefits also can be an effective tool in many situations. These incentives come in several forms, most of which we discuss in this course.
One incentive-based method that seems to be gaining favor in developing nations is PES. PES stands for Payments for Environmental Services. The basic idea of PES is to create incentives for conservation of natural resources by transferring dollars from those that benefit from conservation to those who bear the (opportunity) costs of conservation.  

In some PES arrangements government and/or NGOs pay landowners to engage in activities to conserve or restore biodiversity. This can be as simple as letting a cow pasture revert back to its natural state or setting aside lands that would otherwise be used for another purpose. 

Costa Rica is a leader in PES and a great example of the power of this approach. From the 1940s through the 1980s, Costa Rica had one of the highest rates of deforestation in the world.  As recently as 1987, forest cover in Costa Rica was as low as 21 percent of national territory, down from over 85 percent in the early 1900s. The principle causes of deforestation were incentives for the conversion of land to agricultural uses, such as preferable tax treatment for lands used to cultivate crops and support cattle, and heavier tax burdens for “unproductive” lands (i.e. lands not used to produce market benefits). People responded to the incentives they faced. Given the costs and benefits of land use it made sense to convert lands to other uses. 

In 1996, leaders in Costa Rica decided to try to reverse this path of biodiversity loss. The main idea was simple: reward landowners for conservation rather than rewarding them for land conversion. A series of forest laws were enacted, which gave favorable tax treatment to conservation and reforestation, banned the export of primary forest products, mandated that banks provide low-interest loans for reforestation, created a system of national parks and forest reserves and, in 1997, enacted a PES system.  

Costa Rica’s PES system involves direct payments to landowners in exchange for the adoption of land uses and management techniques that provide one or more of four services:  Greenhouse gas mitigation, provision of water or other hydrological services, conservation of biodiversity or provision of scenic beauty for recreation and tourism. Payments are provided by government. Revenues from a fuel tax (ala Pigou) are a primary source of funding. Other sources of funds include sale of carbon credits to other nations and international loans. Between 1997 and 2005, a half-million hectares of forest lands were enrolled in the program. Forest cover is now over 60 percent and rising.

While this progress is exemplary, the Costa Rican Minister of the Environment recently stated that it is getting increasingly difficult to conserve. Without a system of international carbon markets, such as that which might take place through large scale adoption of REDD and REDD+ schemes, he suggested that the Costa Rican path of conservation will soon be unsustainable.

Read more about Costa Rica’s PES experience here at PaxNatura.

Read more about PES here at UNEP and at Ecology and Society.

Friday, September 11, 2015

Welcome CERMES, UWI students!

Starting this week we will be joined by 15 masters students at the University of the West Indies - Cave Hill.  These students are enrolled in the MSc in Natural Resource and Environmental Management program at The Centre for Resource Management and Environmental Studies (CERMES), and hail from 9 different countries:  Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Italy, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago.

The CERMES students will be with us until around Thanksgiving. Their course follows the same basic outline and topic coverage. 

Welcome!

Friday, September 4, 2015

Standards and Incentives

As we move into discussion of correcting market failures, it’s important to have different perspectives and examples. Below are some links to excellent sources of information regarding standards (command and control) and incentive-based systems.



Here is some excellent reading from the US EPA on standards vs. incentives.

More detail is provided in this document (also from EPA. Note that Coase is covered on page 4-4). 

Here is a nice paper on the topic from the World Resources Institute.


Here is a link to a report on the use of economic incentives for pollution control in the US. You can use the "quick links" on the right to navigate the document.

Environmental Defense Fund has a short piece on how the use of incentives was a powerful solution to addressing acid rain.

The Environmental Literacy Council has a nice short article on standards vs. incentives.

Here's more from the World Bank.

Here is a short article on economic incentives for water quality management from the WHO.

Here is a great article by Robert Stavins on the topic.

Lots of great information in this report on Economic Incentives for Pollution Control from UNEP.



Finally, the other day in class I mentioned CAFE standards (which set minimum miles-per-gallon averages for automobiles)Here is a site with some of the basics from the USDOT.  More here (including history of CAFE standards) from the UCS.


What are some success stories where economic incentives have been used to reduce pollution?
If incentive-based systems are superior, why do we rely so heavily on standards?

Monday, August 31, 2015

The real costs of gasoline (and electricity)

We're studying negative externalities. Externalities are an example of market failure and in the case of negative externalities are  situations where a market creates a cost that is paid by someone else.  The outcome is inefficient:  society would be better off if less of these goods were produced.

In class I mentioned pollution from automobiles as an example and suggested that the "real cost" of a gallon of gasoline is more than just the production and distribution costs, but includes higher mortality and morbidity, loss of productivity, congestion and resource depletion.  

Here is some reading on the topic:

An interview at NPR regarding a study by the IMF

A summary of a study from Duke University at ecomento (an electric car blog)

More on the Duke U. study here at Forbes

Here is the full study at Climatic Change

Are electric cars better?  It depends on where you live.

Monday, August 17, 2015

Welcome fall 2015 UNCW students

Hello class! Welcome to the Natural Resource Economics blog.
I'll use this blog to post links to readings that are relevant to our course.  Please respond with comments, links and questions.  More coming soon...

Thursday, June 18, 2015

Happy Summer!

I hope you enjoyed the course. Please feel free to post your favorite or least favorite topics here. Did you learn some new and useful stuff?  What topics would you say are essential for EVS majors to understand? How about ECN majors? I enjoyed the course and our discussions very much. I hope the rest of your summer is great. 

Wednesday, June 17, 2015

What works in fisheries management?

Here is a great article by J. Sutinen illustrating the historical failure of command-and-control approaches to fisheries management.

ITQ systems (aka: "catch share systems") are basically cap and trade for fishing, and look like a very promising policy solution.  Here is an article from EDF on the basics.  More here from the Fish Project (Oregon Institute of Marine Biology).  Here is a nice summary from the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council.

Here is another article from EDF regarding improved fisher safety under ITQs.   

Here is a map and list of ITQ managed fisheries in the world (old data, there are a lot more now).

Read about success in Iceland (from EDF). 

Are there downsides and complications to this approach to fisheries management? Yes, of course. No policy will be a panacea.  Perfect solutions do not exist. 

Dismissal of promising policy solutions?

Cap and trade is a policy solution that works to reduce pollution faster and at lower cost than standards. We know it can work because it has been used successfully to reduce SO2 and NOx emissions from power plants under the US Acid Rain Program (trading has taken place since 1994).  It worked to expedite the removal of lead from gasoline (read pages 82-83), it worked to phase-out CFCs and halons, it worked to reduce smog in Los Angeles under the RECLAIM program, and it worked to significantly reduce emissions in the EU.  Can it work on a global scale with C02?  It seems promising. Will it be complicated? Yes. Will there be opposition? Yes. Will there be unintended consequences? Yes. Should we therefore dismiss it?

Read more here at Forbes
Here at C2ES 

Monday, June 15, 2015

REDD and REDD+

What policies can be implemented to slow deforestation?  Your first answer might be "make it illegal", via command-and-control (standards).  The problem with this approach is that it does not recognize that people lives depend on earning money from the forests.  What if poor nations could profit from NOT cutting trees rather than profiting from cutting trees?   

REDD stands for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation. Think of it as a global PES system. 

The system works as follows:

The carbon stored in standing trees in a country is estimated.  Carbon losses from continued "business as usual" (BAU) deforestation and forest degradation are also estimated. The country then undergoes conservation activities to reduce deforestation below the projected BAU level.

The carbon "saved" via conservation activities is credited to the country and made available for sale in international carbon markets.  (Developed) countries (or states) that face carbon reduction requirements can reduce their own emissions and/or purchase credits on the international market.

This provides a monetary incentive to preserve standing forests as long as the profit that can be earned by selling carbon credits exceeds the profit that can be earned from various forms of development that require deforestation.

Sounds good. The skewed intertemporal and international distribution of costs and benefits are a big reason for tropical deforestation.  The benefits of deforestation are realized by current generations, but the costs of deforestation are "paid" by future generations (in large part by developing nations).  You're thinking about Hardin's Tragedy here I hope.

If developed countries buy carbon credits from developing nations, forests are preserved for future generations. Obviously there are a lot of complications and concerns. This will be true for any policy.

Read more about the basics of REDD and REDD+ here at the UN

FAQs here

Some cool videos here.

Are there problems and unintended consequences? Yes, of course.

Read more here and here.

Can these problems be overcome? 

P.S. I have a former student who is working on this REDD project.